














IFN Working Paper No. 855, 2010 
 
 
The Right Look: Conservative Politicians Look 
Better and Voters Reward It  
 






   1 
THE RIGHT LOOK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS LOOK 
BETTER AND VOTERS REWARD IT
* 
 
NICLAS BERGGREN, HENRIK JORDAHL, AND PANU POUTVAARA
# 
Revised version: February 8, 2012 
 
Political candidates on the right are more beautiful or are seen as more competent than candidates on the left in Australia, 
Finland, France, and the United States. This appearance gap gives candidates on the right an advantage in elections, which 
could in turn influence policy outcomes. As an illustration, the Republican share of seats increased by an average of 6% in 
the 2000–2006 U.S. Senate elections because they fielded candidates who looked more competent. These shifts are big 
enough to have given the Republicans a Senate majority in two of the four Congresses in the studied time period. The 
Republicans also won nine of the 15 gubernatorial elections where looks were decisive. Using Finnish data, we also show 
that beauty is an asset for political candidates in intra-party competition and more so for candidates on the right in low-
information elections. Our analysis indicates that this advantage arises since voters use good looks as a cue for conservatism 
when candidates are relatively unknown.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Voters in representative democracies delegate considerable power to elected politicians. It is 
crucial that this is carried out in a well-informed and knowledgeable fashion, as stressed by one of the 
founding fathers of the United States, James Madison: 
 
       A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or 
a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
1  
 
Unfortunately, there are ample indications that a large fraction of voters fall short of such a 
knowledge ideal – see, e.g., Somin (2006), Caplan (2007), and Nyhan and Reifler (2010).
 Instead, they 
often rely on various heuristics when choosing whom to vote for, as demonstrated by, e.g., Lau and 
Redlawsk (2001) and Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011). One such heuristic is candidate appearance. 
Todorov et al. (2005) were able to make surprisingly accurate predictions of elections to the U.S. 
Congress  (for  72%  of  Senate  races  and  for  67%  of  House  races)  by  comparing  inferences  of 
competence from photos of  competing candidates. Since the appearance of candidates may differ 
systematically between political parties, this opens up for the possibility that the use of heuristics gives 
either the political left or the right an advantage in elections.
2 
We show that candidates on the right have an appearance advantage over candidates on the left 
in  Australia  (election  to  the  House  of  Representatives) ,  Finland  (municipal  and  parliamentary 
elections),  France  ( parliamentary  elections),  and  the  United  States  (Senate  and  gubernatorial 
                                                       
1 The quote is from a letter to W. T. Barry in 1822, reproduced in Kurland and Lerner (2000, vol. 1, ch. 18, doc. 35). A 
similar point is made in Brennan (2011). 
2 Besley and Coate (1997) explicitly mention a preference for good looks as a reason for voters to care about the identity of 
representatives in their citizen-candidate model. In a similar vein, the impact of candidate appearance can be captured in 
probabilistic voting models (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, 1993) by interpreting the non -policy-related preference for a 
candidate as stemming from his or her appearance.   3 
elections).
3 Given that previous research has shown that candidate appearance is related to electoral 
success in all of these countries, our results  suggest that the appearance gap tilts policy outcomes to 
the right.
4 
The consequences of appearance are politically relevant. Counterfactual calculations for U.S. 
Senate races from 2000 to 2006  indicate  that equalizing the appearance of the Democratic and 
Republican candidates would have changed the winner in  one in five races. Appearance differences 
gave the Republicans a 6%  net increase in their share of Senators in these elections.  Furthermore, 
according to our calculations, the looks of candidates have switched the Senate majority in three out of 
the four U.S. Congresses under study. According to the same method, one in eight U.S. gubernatorial 
elections  between 1995 and 2006   has been decided by the appearance advantage of  one of the 
candidates, mostly the Republican one. 
In the present study, we also investigate whether the effect of an appealing appearance, in terms 
of more votes, is the same for candidates on the right and on the left. We test  this hypothesis using 
data on candidate appearance and electoral success from Finland. As  Finland  has a proportional 
electoral system with multi-member districts, personal votes, and within-party competition, we can 
study how candidate appearance affects electoral success within party lists. This avoids  any problems 
of reverse causality (where parties may attract more beautiful candidates in districts where they expect 
to be electorally successful). Such an analysis is not possible to perform in elections between one right 
and one left candidate, which are typical of countries that have a plurality system. In fact, the existence 
of an appearance advantage for candidates on the right in such settings introduces a risk for spurious 
                                                       
3  Budge  and  Robertson  (1987,  394–395)  differentiate  between  left  and  right  in  terms  of  “economic-policy  conflicts  – 
government  regulation of  the  economy  through  direct  controls or  takeover  …  as opposed  to  free  enterprise,  individual 
freedom, incentives and economic orthodoxy.” On the fruitful cross-national usage of left-right terminology, see Bobbio 
(1996) and Mair (2007). 
4 Previous studies that show that better-looking candidates win more votes include Ballew and Todorov (2007), Rosar, Klein, 
and Beckers (2008), Antonakis and Dalgas (2009), Poutvaara, Jordahl, and Berggren (2009), King and Leigh (2 009), 
Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010), Lawson et al. (2010), Lutz (2010), Olivola and Todorov (2010), and Rule at al. 
(2010).   4 
correlation when estimating the average beauty premium in elections where either the left or the right 
performed particularly well. In order to avoid bias one would need to control for all the determinants 
of the vote, which is difficult given that most variation in election outcomes is not accounted for 
(Benjamin and Shapiro 2009). 
Our findings show that the beauty premium is twice as large for candidates on the right in 
municipal (i.e., low-information) elections but that there is no partisan difference in electoral returns to 
beauty in parliamentary (i.e., high-information) elections. In municipal elections, a beauty increase of 
one standard deviation attracts about 30% more votes for the average right non-incumbent candidate 
and about 15% more votes for the average left non-incumbent candidate. In the parliamentary election, 
the corresponding figure is about 20% for left and right candidates alike. 
Why do the beauty premia differ between the left and the right in low-information elections? 
The reason seems to be that voters use beauty as a cue for candidate ideology. Voters on the right 
expect  visually  appealing  candidates  to  be  closer  to  them  ideologically.  To  test  this,  we  asked 
respondents to make photo-based inferences of which party (left or right) Finnish political candidates 
represent. We find that candidates who represent the left as well as those who represent the right are 
seen as better looking if they are inferred to represent the right, suggesting that beauty is indeed used 
as a cue for ideology. This finding accords well with indications in a few early studies that analyzed 
small samples of politicians in the United Kingdom. Jahoda (1954), Bull and Hawkes (1982), and 
Bull, Jenkins, and Stevens (1983) found that MPs who were perceived to belong to the Conservative 
Party were rated as more attractive and intelligent than MPs who were perceived to belong to the 
Labour Party. However, unlike the present analysis, these early studies did not explore whether right 
politicians actually looked better. 
Why do parties on the right field better-looking candidates than parties on the left? On the 
supply side, we argue that beautiful people are more inclined to be conservative both because beauty is 
positively related to earnings (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) and because beautiful people are treated 
better throughout life (Langlois et al. 2000). Therefore, beautiful people tend to see the world as a just 
place.  On  the  demand  side,  the  larger  beauty  premium  for  right  candidates  in  municipal  (low-
information) elections provides an added incentive for good-looking persons to enter politics if they   5 
belong to the political right. 
Still, the fact that the beauty premium does not differ between candidates on the left and on the 
right in parliamentary (high-information) elections shows that beauty is valued by voters across the 
political spectrum. This general advantage of good-looking candidates could be explained either by a 
belief that they are more productive or by emotional reasons to express support for them.
5 Regardless 
of why beauty matters, candidates on the right  have an edge in elections as a result of  their better 
looks, which could tilt policies to the right. 
 
 
II.   DATA 
 
In order to study candidate appearance on the left and right we make use of our own data from 
Finland as well as data from Australia, France, and the United States, generously provided to us by 
other groups of researchers. The data from the United States allow us to examine how appearance 
might benefit one party over the other in Senate and gubernatorial elections. However, as described in 
the introduction, it is not possible to estimate beauty premia – the extent to which a given beauty level 
translates into votes – for left and right candidates separately using data from elections with one left 
and one right candidate. For this purpose, we use Finnish data, derived from an electoral system with 
intra-party competition. Another advantage of the Finnish proportional electoral system that has a 
personal vote is that it allows us to study competition between non-incumbents. Voters can be 
expected to rely more on appearance when evaluating non-incumbents, most of whom are unfamiliar 
to them. 
 
II.A.   Finland 
Our own data on municipal and parliamentary Finnish candidates were collected in a web 
                                                       
5  On  the  evolutionary  origins of  an  appreciation  of  beauty,  see  the  original  contribution  by  Darwin  (1871)  and  recent 
evidence in Grammer et al. (2003) and Rhodes (2006).   6 
survey with 2,513 respondents from outside of Finland to ensure that the candidates were not 
recognized. We study candidates from one party to the right, the National Coalition Party, and from 
two parties to the left, the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance. The majority of our 
respondents were from Sweden or the United States, but we also had significant participation from 
France, Germany, and Denmark. (Table S.I in the online Supplementary Material reports the number 
of respondents per country.) Each respondent was shown four photographs (two of each gender), one 
at a time, randomly chosen from the database of photographs, and was asked to evaluate each 
photograph, e.g., in terms of attractiveness and competence. Our main question was: 
 
What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness of this person compared to the average among 
people living in your country of residence? 
Very unattractive (1) 
Below average (2) 
Average (3) 
Above average (4) 
Very handsome or beautiful (5) 
Cannot say/Prefer not to answer 
 
For  our data  analysis, the  replies  were  coded  from  1 to  5,  as indicated  above.  Our  survey 
comprised 1,356 photographs, which were on average evaluated by nine respondents each. There was 
substantial agreement among respondents; if we concentrate on two groups of beauty assessments – 
above average (4 and 5) and below average (1 and 2) – the kappa coefficient of inter-rater agreement 
was 0.47, which was statistically significant at the 1% level. The corresponding kappa coefficient for 
competence was 0.19, which was also statistically significant at the 1% level. The photographs were 
divided into 684 of women and 673 of men; 575 from the 2003 parliamentary election and 782 from 
the 2004 municipal elections; and 1,170 of non-incumbents and 187 of incumbents.
6 The photographs 
only showed the faces of the candidates and no information was given about them. These photographs 
                                                       
6 By incumbent, we mean a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as members of the national or the 
European parliaments, at the time of the election.   7 
had  previously  been  displayed  by  the  political  parties  on  their  campaign  posters  as  well  as  in 
newspaper ads. Most voters can be expected to have seen most candidate photographs. 
Finland has a proportional electoral system in both municipal and parliamentary elections. Each 
voter has to vote for one candidate on a party list. Unlike in some other countries, it is not possible to 
vote for a list without picking a candidate. The seats are allocated to different parties based on their 
vote shares, using the d’Hondt seat allocation rule. Candidates from a given party are elected in the 
order of their personal votes in their district. 
 
II.B.   Australia, the United States, and France 
For Australian candidates, we rely on data from King and Leigh (2009), who asked four 
Australian respondents to rate the physical attractiveness of 286 candidates in the 2004 election to the 
federal House of Representatives. Australia uses preferential voting, also known as the automatic run-
off, and voting is compulsory. The candidates represent one party to the left, the Australian Labor 
Party, and two parties to the right, the Liberal Party of Australia and the National Party. The two latter 
parties operate in coalition with one another and do not run candidates against a sitting member of the 
other party. 
King and Leigh used candidate photographs from archived versions of party websites and were 
able to verify that almost all of these photographs were used on the How-to-Vote cards that party 
representatives hand out to voters at polling stations. They measured physical attractiveness on a scale 
from 1 to 10 and asked their respondents to try to maintain an average rating of 5. The scores of each 
individual rater were standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of unity. Beauty ratings 
were then obtained by summing the four standardized ratings of each politician and standardizing 
those sums.  
For the United States, we use data collected by Todorov et al. (2005) and Ballew and Todorov 
(2007) for 240 candidates running in the Senate elections between 2000 and 2006 and for 248 
candidates running in the gubernatorial elections between 1995 and 2006. A large sample of Princeton 
University students were shown black-and-white headshots of two candidates at a time and were asked   8 
to indicate who looked more competent. The resulting competence ratings reflect the proportion of 
participants who judged one of the two candidates in a race as more competent. 
For France, we obtained competence ratings collected by Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) of 114 
candidates from the run-off stages of the 2002 French parliamentary election. In each of the 57 run-off 
elections, one candidate belonged to the right coalition (Majorité présidentielle) and the other to the 
left coalition of parties (Gauche parlementaire). Competence ratings were assembled from 684 Swiss 
public university students who compared pairs of faces using a 6-point rating scale. 
 
 
III.   THE APPEARANCE GAP BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT CANDIDATES 
 
In this section, we compare beauty and competence evaluations of left and right candidates in 
Finland, Australia, the United States, and France. As long as we stick to within-country comparisons 
between left and right candidates, the appearance gaps between them should be comparable between 
countries,  since  respondents  in  different  Western  countries  have  been  found  to  make  similar 
evaluations (Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2010). Lawson et al. (2010) generalize this finding to 
more dissimilar countries by demonstrating that evaluations by subjects living in the United States and 
India predict actual election outcomes in Mexico and Brazil. Likewise, Rule et al. (2010) report that 
U.S. and Japanese participants made similar inferences from the faces of both U.S. and Japanese 
political candidates and that their evaluations predicted election outcomes between cultures. 
 
III.A.   Finland 
We begin by reporting the average evaluations of Finnish municipal candidates. Table I shows 
that right candidates are seen as more beautiful than left candidates and are, to a lesser extent, seen as 
more competent. Female candidates (both right and left) receive higher beauty evaluations than male 
candidates, whereas competence evaluations are roughly equal for men and women. Incumbents are   9 
generally  evaluated  as  better  looking  and  more  competent  than  non-incumbents.
7  The  correlation 
coefficient between beauty and competence is 0.39. 
Table II shows that right candidates are judged to be better looking than left candidates in the 
parliamentary election  as well.  In general, right parliamentary candidates are also seen as more 
competent than left candidates.
8 The correlation coefficient between beauty and competence is 0.36. 
Compared with the municipal candidates in Table I, the parliamentary candidates look slightly better 
and more competent. 
 
   
                                                       
7 The differences in Table I cannot be explained by age differences between left and right candidates. The mean age of left 
and right candidates differ by less than one year. Male candidates are four years older than female candidates and incumbents 
are seven years older than non-incumbents, on average. 
8 The differences in Table II cannot be explained by age differences between left and right candidates. As in Table I, the 
mean age of left and right candidates differ by less than one year.   10 
TABLE I 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS IN FINNISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN 2004 (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right candidates  2.89 (0.71)  3.32 (0.41)  262 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.001   
Left candidates  2.59 (0.61)  3.20 (0.45)  518 
Right female candidates  3.08 (0.79)  3.34 (0.37)  139 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female candidates  2.63 (0.67)  3.17 (0.41)  240 
Right male candidates  2.68 (0.53)  3.30 (0.45)  123 
p-value of difference  0.045  0.247   
Left male candidates  2.56 (0.60)  3.24 (0.49)  278 
Right female incumbents  3.07 (0.75)  3.32 (0.33)  21 
p-value of difference  0.160  0.741   
Left female incumbents  2.78 (0.63)  3.36 (0.47)  26 
Right male incumbents  2.77 (0.51)  3.48 (0.28)  25 
p-value of difference  0.055  0.640   
Left male incumbents  2.50 (0.52)  3.43 (0.48)  24 
Right female non-incumbents  3.08 (0.80)  3.34 (0.38)  118 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female non-incumbents  2.61 (0.67)  3.14 (0.39)  214 
Right male non-incumbents  2.65 (0.54)  3.26 (0.47)  98 
p-value of difference  0.184  0.582   
Left male non-incumbents  2.56 (0.55)  3.23 (0.78)  254 
All municipal candidates  2.69 (0.66)  3.25 (0.44)  780 
   Notes. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to 
the Left Alliance. An incumbent is a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as a member of the national 
or the European parliaments, at the time of the election. One observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values 
from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations of right and left candidates. 
   
 
     11 
TABLE II 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS IN FINNISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN 2003 (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right candidates  2.93 (0.62)  3.55 (0.45)  202 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left candidates  2.70 (0.67)  3.31 (0.51)  373 
Right female candidates  3.06 (0.67)  3.52 (0.40)  108 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female candidates  2.82 (0.74)  3.29 (0.46)  195 
Right male candidates  2.78 (0.51)  3.58 (0.49)  94 
p-value of difference  0.002  0.000   
Left male candidates  2.56 (0.56)  3.34 (0.55)  178 
Right female incumbents  3.54 (0.52)  3.87 (0.36)  16 
p-value of difference  0.001  0.001   
Left female incumbents  2.93 (0.53)  3.45 (0.36)  25 
Right male incumbents  2.92 (0.57)  3.64 (0.44)  21 
p-value of difference  0.012  0.214   
Left male incumbents  2.52 (0.49)  3.45 (0.55)  28 
Right female non-incumbents  2.98 (0.66)  3.45 (0.38)  92 
p-value of difference  0.070  0.001   
Left female non-incumbents  2.81 (0.76)  3.27 (0.76)  170 
Right male non-incumbents  2.73 (0.49)  3.56 (0.50)  73 
p-value of difference  0.035  0.001   
Left male non-incumbents  2.57 (0.57)  3.31 (0.55)  150 
All parliamentary candidates  2.78 (0.66)  3.39 (0.50)  575 
   Notes. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to 
the Left Alliance. An incumbent is a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as a member of the European 
parliament, at the time of the election. One observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of 
equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations of right and left candidates. 
 
Ethnicity  does  not  have  any  significant  impact  on  the  results,  since  only  1.1%  of  right 
candidates  and  1.8%  of  left  candidates  have  immigrant  backgrounds,  based  on  their  photo 
appearances. A potential problem relating to the validity of the evaluations, however, is that right and   12 
left candidates may choose to present themselves in somewhat different fashions (e.g., with regard to 
clothing and jewelry). Therefore, there is a risk that the evaluations reflect the political orientations of 
respondents. In particular, our use of foreign respondents could be problematic if, for instance, U.S. 
respondents are more conservative on average and, therefore, evaluate right political candidates as 
relatively better looking. 
We address this issue from three angles. First, we divide respondents according to their views 
on taxes and redistribution in order to investigate whether the evaluation differences are driven by the 
political orientations of respondents. Second, we compare the evaluations of respondents from Sweden 
with those of U.S. respondents. Third, we test whether political candidates who wear a tie (for men) or 
a blouse and/or a suit (for women) are given different evaluations than those who do not. 
As  reported  in  Table  A.I  in  the  Appendix,  the  beauty  differences  between  right  and  left 
candidates  remain both  for  right and for  left respondents  (as classified  by  whether they  agree  or 
disagree with the suggestion “to increase taxes on those with high incomes in your country, and 
distribute the money to those with low incomes.”). For male candidates, the beauty difference is, 
however,  not  statistically  significant  when  evaluated  by  left  respondents.  The  differences  in 
competence also remain, but are generally smaller and in some cases not statistically significant. Table 
S.II in the online Supplementary Material shows that right candidates are perceived as more beautiful 
and competent by respondents  both from Sweden and from the United States (although for male 
candidates the differences are not statistically significant among respondents from Sweden). Table 
S.III in the online Supplementary Material demonstrates that what candidates wear only seems to 
affect how competent they are perceived to be. For beauty, the differences are smaller and statistically 
insignificant for both female and male candidates. We conclude that the higher beauty and competence 
evaluations of right candidates do not only reflect the political opinions of respondents. 
Another  concern  is  that  the  appearance  gap  in  favor  of  right  politicians  could  result  from 
differences in the quality of photographs; perhaps right parties spend more on photographers so that 
their candidates look better in campaign material. We tested for photograph-quality differences by 
having two men and two women from Germany and from Sweden evaluate 100 randomly selected   13 
pairs of photographs.
9 This photograph-quality evaluation was conducted independent of the collection 
of appearance ratings. Respondents indicated whether one of the photographs was of higher quality, 
whether the photographs were of similar quality or whether an assessment could not be made, and in 
so doing they were explicitly  instructed to disregard any aspects concerning the appearance of the 
persons in the photographs. Photographs of left candidates were evaluated to be of higher quality more 
often than photographs of right candidates: in 57% and in 34% of the cases, respectively.
10 Therefore, 
the appearance gap in favor of right politicians does  not seem to be driven by  the quality of the 
photographs.  If  anything,  the  photograph-quality  evaluations  may  be  taken  to  imply  that  we 
underestimate this gap. 
Finally, we note that in the 2003 Finnish National Election Study, more than one third of voters 
reported that they were influenced by the presence and style of candidates and more than one fifth by 
their election campaigns and advertisements. Table A.II in the Appendix presents these numbers 
separately for right and left voters. For our purposes, it  is eye-catching that voters who are politically 
to the right state that they were more influenced by education, presence and style, and campaigns and 




III.B.   Australia, the United States, and France 
Next, we compare the appearance of left and right candidates in Australia, the United States, 
and  France.  These  data  were  collected  by  other  groups  of  researchers  and  they  contain  fewer 
candidates, fewer variables, and smaller shares of female candidates than our own data from Finland. 
                                                       
9 This was carried out by randomly selecting 50 photographs of men and 50 photographs of women from the left, and then 
matching  each  photograph  with  a  photograph  of  a  candidate  of  the  same  gender  in  the  same  district  from  the  right. 
Candidates were matched by choosing the candidate from the right who was closest in age. 
10 Furthermore, although there is a positive correlation between photograph quality and beauty evaluations, right candidates 
are evaluated as better looking both in photographs that are of lower and of higher quality than those of left candidates, as 
well as in photographs that are of similar quality.   14 
As a consequence, we cannot carry out all the comparisons and examinations that we did for the 
Finnish candidates in Section III.A. Still, it is important to investigate other countries in order to assess 
the generality of an appearance gap in favor of right candidates. 
  Table III presents the evaluations for Australian candidates. The table demonstrates that there is 
also a beauty gap in Australian politics. This gap remains when controlling for candidate gender and 
for incumbency, although it is not statistically significant among the small group of female candidates 
(with an unexpected sign switch for female non-incumbents). 
  
TABLE III 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS IN THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION IN 2004 
  Beauty  Number of candidates 
Right candidates  0.165  137 
p-value of difference  0.007   
Left candidates  -0.151   149 
Right female candidates  0.583  31 
p-value of difference  0.693   
Left female candidates  0.481  43 
Right male candidates  0.042  106 
p-value of difference  0.000   
Left male candidates  -0.408  106 
Right female incumbents  0.597  16 
p-value of difference  0.262   
Left female incumbents  0.184  18 
Right male incumbents  -0.222  51 
p-value of difference  0.029   
Left male incumbents  -.578  42 
Right female non-incumbents  0.568  15 
p-value of difference  0.732   
Left female non-incumbents  0.694  25 
Right male non-incumbents  0.287  55 
p-value of difference  0.001   
Left male non-incumbents  -0.296  64 
   Notes. Right candidates belong to the Liberal Party of Australia or to the National Party. Left candidates belong to the 
Australian Labor Party. The beauty ratings are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity (among all 
candidates). One observation is the standardized evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal means are 
reported between each pair of evaluations of right and left candidates.   15 
 
For the United States, we analyze data for the 2000–2006 Senate elections and the 1995–2006 
gubernatorial  elections.  Table  4  reports  the  shares  of  respondents  who  evaluated  the  Republican 
candidate as more competent than the Democratic candidate in different types of elections. Republican 
candidates are consistently seen as more competent, although levels of statistical significance vary 
(both because of the smaller difference in Senate than in gubernatorial races and because we have 




SHARE OF RESPONDENTS EVALUATING THE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE AS MORE COMPETENT IN U.S. ELECTIONS  
  Competence  Number of races 
All races  53.1% (0.021)  244 
Senate races  51.9% (0.274)  120 
Gubernatorial races  54.2% (0.036)  124 
Same sex races  53.6% (0.033)  181 
Races with an incumbent  53.3% (0.041)  169 
Races with two non-incumbents   52.5% (0.278)  75 
Same sex races with an incumbent  53.3% (0.082)  131 
Same sex races with two non-incumbents  53.4% (0.211)  50 
   Notes.  The  competence  evaluation  is  the  average  share  of  respondents  who  rated  the  Republican  candidate  as  more 
competent than the Democratic candidate. The candidates are from the 2000–2006 Senate elections and the 1995–2006 
gubernatorial elections. Only races that include one Republican and one Democratic candidate are included. Bernie Sanders, 
who ran as an independent in Vermont 2006, is counted as a Democrat since he won the Democratic primary and caucused 
with the Democratic Party. P-values from a t-test of equal evaluations of Republicans and Democrats are in parentheses. 
 
We also have competence evaluations for the French candidates from the run-off stages of the 
2002 parliamentary election. The ratings of the 114 candidates are based on pairwise comparisons.
12 
                                                       
11 Benjamin and Shapiro (2009) collected evaluations of video clips from a sample of 58 U.S. gubernatorial debates. In their 
data set, the Republican candidates are evaluated as more attractive but the difference is not statistically significant. We use 
the data set collected by Ballew and Todorov (2007) since it encompasses 248 gubernatorial candidates and since it – like our 
data for other countries – is based on photo evaluations. 
12 Participants were given a questionnaire with one pair of faces and were asked to rate which of the two individuals was   16 
The  results  show  that  right  candidates  look  more  competent:  their  average  rating  is  3.75  with  a 
standard deviation of 0.44. This can be compared with a rating of 3.5, which would imply a tie (and 
the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level).
13 
Table V summarizes the appearance gaps for the four countries for which we have obtained 
data. Although party systems and available measures vary (for countries other than Finland we  only 
have either beauty or competence), the table suggests without exception that there is an advantage for 
right candidates in terms of having better looks compared with left candidates. 
 
TABLE V 
BEAUTY AND COMPETENCE ADVANTAGES FOR RIGHT POLITICAL CANDIDATES 
  Beauty advantage  Competence advantage  Source 
Australia, House of Representatives  32%***  n.a.  King and Leigh (2009) 
Finland, municipal  46%***   27%***   Own data 
Finland, parliamentary  35%***  48%***  Own data 
France, parliamentary  n.a.  59%***  Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) 
United States, gubernatorial races  n.a.  18%**  Ballew and Todorov (2007) 
United States, Senate races  n.a.  8%  Todorov et al. (2005) 
   Notes. For Australia and Finland, “beauty advantage” is defined as the difference between the average beauty rating of right 
and left candidates, expressed as a percentage share of the standard deviation of the candidates’ beauty ratings. “Competence 
advantage” is defined analogously for Finland. For France, competence advantage is based on pairwise comparisons and 
measured as a difference between the average rating of right politicians on a 1–6 scale and the rating of 3.5, which would 
imply a tie, expressed as a percentage share of the standard deviation of this variable. For the United States, the reported 
numbers are the difference between the share of respondents rating the Republican as more competent and the share rating 
the Democrat as more competent, divided by the latter. * difference is significant at 10%; ** difference is significant at 5%; 
*** difference is significant at 1%. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
more competent using a 6-point rating scale: 1 (or 6)—definitely the person on the left (or right); 2 (or 5)—the person on the 
left (or right); and 3 (or 4)—most probably the person on the left (or right). 
13 Since the data only include pairs where the loser of the run-off was the incumbent and since female candidates were only 
involved in three run-offs, we do not divide the French data into subgroups.   17 
III.C.   Beauty and Conservatism  
  Why do parties on the right field better-looking candidates? A simple economic explanation on 
the supply side is that beautiful people earn more money on the labor market (Hamermesh and Biddle 
1994; Scholz and Sicinski 2011) and are therefore – for selfish reasons – more inclined to oppose 
redistribution and support parties to the right. A more general psychological explanation could be that 
good-looking people are more likely to perceive the world as a just place, since they are treated better 
than others (Langlois et al. 2000) and since they are happier (Hamermesh and Abrevaya 2011).
14 
These reasons could make beautiful people inclined to embrace conservative opinions, implying that 
the pool of potential candidates will include a larger share of good -looking people on the right. In 
Sections V and VI, we examine whether there is also a demand-side explanation for there being more 
visually appealing candidates on the right. 
 
 
IV.   THE IMPACT OF APPEARANCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS 
 
In this section, we investigate the effect of the appearance gap on the success of Republicans 
and Democrats in U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections. We do this using the data collected by 
Todorov et al. (2005) and Ballew and Todorov (2007) that we analyzed in Section III.B. 
 
IV.A.   Elections to the Senate 
To  simulate  the  impact  of  appearance  on  elections  to  the  U.S.  Senate,  we  calculate 
counterfactual  vote  shares  in  the  2000–2006  Senate  elections  conditional  on  the  removal  of  the 
appearance gap between each pair of candidates. To do this, we use the data collected by Todorov et 
al. (2005) and Ballew and Todorov (2007). For the effect of competence judgments, we use the partial 
standardized regression coefficient from Table 2 in Todorov et al. (2005). 
                                                       
14 In fact, Napier and Jost (2008) present results to the effect that conservatives are happier precisely because they do not see 
a need for egalitarianism, i.e., because they by and large perceive the world as a just place.   18 
Admittedly, this is a somewhat speculative exercise, but we consider it informative since it 
illustrates  that  differences  in  appearance  can  have  major  consequences  for  political  outcomes. 
According to this exercise, the winner changes in 23 out of 120 Senate races (19% of all races covered 
in the data we have available). The winner changes from Republican to Democrat in 15 races and from 
Democrat to Republican in eight races. Therefore, the net gain from candidate appearance for the 
Republicans would be seven seats (6% of the contested seats in the data). 
Studying races without an incumbent is particularly interesting as it avoids the risk of confusing 
the advantages of appearance and incumbency.  In our data, 22 out of the 120 Senate races were 
contests  over  an  empty  seat.  Equalizing  the  appearance  of  candidates  would  have  changed  the 
outcome  in  seven  of  the  22  races.  In  five,  the  winner  would  have  changed  from  Republican  to 
Democrat and in two from Democrat to Republican. The net shift from appearance equality would 
have been 14% of contested seats to the Republicans. Although this sample of races is small, the 
pattern  that  appearance  matters  more  among  non-incumbents  is  intuitive  and  in  line  with  what 
Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010) find for Finnish elections. 
These hypothetical seat changes are unevenly distributed over time. As shown in Table VI, our 
calculations indicate that Republicans won their Senate majorities in the 108
th and 109
th Congresses 
because they fielded better-looking candidates. The Senate of the 107
th Congress was initially split, 
50–50, between the two parties, but that would not have been the case if the Democrats had not 
benefited from the looks of their candidates in a few close races  in the Senate elections of 2000 
(notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Republican  candidates  looked  slightly  better  on  average).  In  all, 
majorities in  three  out  of  the  four  Senate elections  for  which  we  have  data would  actually  have 
changed if the appearance difference between candidates had somehow been eliminated. 
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TABLE VI 
THE IMPACT OF APPEARANCE ON U.S. SENATE MAJORITIES 
US Congress  No. of Republican 
Senators 
Estimated Republican 
net gain of the 
appearance gap 
Majority change owing to the 
appearance gap  
107
th (2001–2003)  50  -2  Yes, but see the note 
108
th (2003–2005)  51  2  Yes 
109
th (2005–2007)  55  6  Yes 
110
th (2007–2009)  49  1  No 
   Notes. The Senate of the 107
th Congress was initially evenly split, 50-50, between the two parties, but as soon as Dick 
Cheney was sworn in as Vice President, the tie-breaking power of the Vice President gave the Republicans the majority. 
However, on June 6, 2001, Senator Jim Jeffords, previously a Republican, declared himself an independent and announced 
that he would join the Democratic caucus, giving the Democrats control of the Senate with a margin of a single seat. 
 
IV.B. Gubernatorial Elections 
We also carried out the same type of calculation for the 1995–2006 U.S. gubernatorial elections. 
Based on the data collected by Ballew and Todorov (2007), we calculate counterfactual vote shares in 
these elections by removing the difference in perceived competence between each pair of candidates. 
For the effect of competence judgments, we use the standardized regression coefficient from Table 2 
in Ballew and Todorov (2007). According to this exercise, the winner changes in 15 out of 124 races 
(12% of all races covered in the data). The winner changes from Republican to Democrat in nine races 
and from Democrat to Republican in six races. Although the net impact of appearance thus seems to 
be somewhat smaller in the gubernatorial than in the Senate elections, the considerable political power 
of a governor still makes a reversal of a gubernatorial election outcome a very significant event. 
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V.   BEAUTY PREMIA IN LOW-INFORMATION AND HIGH-INFORMATION ELECTIONS 
 
Elections between two (main) candidates cannot be used to investigate whether the effect of 
candidate  appearance  differs  between  the  left  and  the  right.  To  answer  this  question,  we  turn  to 
Finland, a country that has a proportional electoral system and intra-party competition between a large 
number of candidates. 
First, it bears noting that electoral competition works quite differently at the municipal and at 
the national level. To win a seat in parliament, a candidate normally has to first win a seat in the 
municipal council. Municipal elections can be characterized as low-information elections – defined by 
Buckley, Collins, and Reidy (2007, 176) as “elections which do not involve significant constitutional 
office and do not attract large scale media coverage” – because only a few candidates (especially 
among non-incumbents) are “career politicians” who are politicians by occupation or have a history of 
active campaigning and public visibility. Advertising is mainly restricted to posters and newspaper 
ads; hardly any candidates run individual campaigns on the television or radio. 
By  contrast,  the  parliamentary  election  can  be  characterized  as  one  of  high  information. 
Parliamentary candidates are a  more select group that is, for several reasons, more visible to the 
public. Many parliamentary candidates hold or have previously held seats at the municipal level and 
have a political history of which voters are aware. Candidates who spend large amounts of money on 
campaigning are mainly observed in the parliamentary election. 
We use regression analysis in order to investigate the relationship between beauty and electoral 
success. We define the Beauty of a candidate as the mean beauty assessment of his or her photo among 
all respondents who evaluated it. Beauty is standardized: each mean assessment is divided by the 
standard deviation of all the mean assessments so that the variable has a standard deviation of one. In 
order to make a clear distinction between low-information and high-information elections we focus on 
non-incumbent  candidates.  We  use  list  fixed  effects  in  our  regressions  in  order  to  capture  how 
beautiful  a  candidate  is  perceived  to  be  in  relation  to  the  other  candidates  on  the  same  list.  We 
compare the electoral success of candidates from the National Coalition Party on the right with that of   21 
candidates from the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance on the left.
15   
Our dependent variable, Relative success, is defined in the following way for candidate i on list 
j:  
 
Relative successi,j = (pi / vj) * 100                                                                    (1) 
 
where pi is candidate i’s number of personal votes and vj is the number of all votes for candidates on 
list j divided by the number of candidates on list j. As the main explanatory variable, we use Beauty.
  
This is in keeping with results found by Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara (2010) and Lutz (2010), 
showing that beauty evaluations have a higher explanatory power than competence evaluations, and 
Verhulst, Lodge, and Lavine (2010), demonstrating that beauty can be seen as a fundamental variable 
with halo effects on character-based inferences such as perceived competence. Beauty is interacted 
with a dummy variable for right candidates (i.e., candidates who belong to the National Coalition 
Party). We also include a dummy variable for male candidates, both by itself and interacted with 
Right.
16  
Table VII contains the regression results that allow us to compare the beauty coefficients of 
right and left candidates. Since our identification comes from the interaction of  Beauty  with  the 
dummy variable Right, we include the interaction of all unreported dummy variables with Right in 
most specifications, but we do not report estimates for the full set of interaction terms in the Table. 
The unreported dummies are Young, which denotes an age under 30, and Old, which denotes an age 
over 60, together with dummies for education. For both the municipal and the parliamentary elections, 
                                                       
15 The pooling of candidates from the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance is supported by statistical tests; there is 
no specification in which we can reject (at the 5% significance level) that the beauty coefficients are equal for candidates 
from these two parties. 
16 No definitive gender differences with regard to beauty premia could be established by Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 
(2010); however, other studies indicate that gender sometimes does matter for reactions to beauty. For example, Dreber, 
Gerdes, and Gränsmark (2010) find that male chess players choose significantly riskier strategies when playing against an 
attractive female opponent, although this does not improve their performances.   22 
we report three specifications that differ in whether we control for education and whether we interact 
the variables with unreported coefficients (age and education) with Right. 
 
TABLE VII  
RELATIVE SUCCESS IN FINNISH ELECTIONS, NON-INCUMBENTS 
  Municipal elections (2004)  Parliamentary election (2003) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Beauty  15.40***  15.91***  16.00**  24.47***  23.90***  20.98*** 
  (4.33)  (4.62)  (4.82)  (5.90)  (5.86)  (5.90) 
Beauty × Right  15.59*  18.64**  15.00**  -2.26  -0.54  2.54 
  (7.94)  (5.67)  (5.86)  (9.75)  (9.20)  (9.24) 
Male dummy  -20.66  -33.84  -31.96  13.50  11.89  13.96* 
  (16.32)  (19.31)  (17.73)  (6.99)  (8.10)  (7.04) 
Male dummy × Right  
 








Age dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Unreported dummies    
interacted with Right 
No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
List fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of candidates   682  682  682  485  485  485 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.08 
   Notes. The dependent variable is Relative success. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates 
belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. The education dummies are Comprehensive school or less (at 
most 10 years of schooling); Upper-secondary education (corresponds to 12 years of schooling); Vocational education (10–
12 years of schooling); and University education (those who have completed their educations and obtained degrees). Upper-
secondary education usually serves as preparation for university-level education, and many of the candidates with upper-
secondary educations listed as highest education have started, but not completed, university studies. Vocational education 
includes, e.g., basic nurses, nurses, commercial school graduates, clerks, and artisans. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
list level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Columns (1)–(3) show that in the municipal elections, the beauty coefficient of right candidates 
is twice as large as that of left candidates (the total beauty coefficient of right candidates is obtained by   23 
adding the coefficients for Beauty and Beauty × Right). The beauty coefficients are not much affected 
by the inclusion of dummies for education. The point estimates also suggest that female left candidates 
do  better  than  male  left  candidates  in  municipal  elections,  although  the  coefficient  for  the  Male 
dummy is not statistically significant at conventional levels. For right candidates there is, however, no 
visible gender difference. In accordance with McDermott (1997), our interpretation is that voters use 
gender as a cue in low-information elections. Since women are typically seen as kinder and more 
compassionate than men, they are stereotyped as caring more about social welfare issues, which could 
make them preferable to men on a left party list with relatively unknown candidates. 
  As  shown  in  columns  (4)–(6),  the  differences  in  the  beauty  premia  between  right  and  left 
candidates that were evident in the municipal elections seem to be absent in the parliamentary election. 
There is a beauty premium for both left and right candidates such that a beauty increase of one 
standard deviation attracts about 20% more votes for the average non-incumbent candidate. Similarly, 
the point estimates for the effects of gender in the parliamentary election are quite small compared 
with the municipal elections. Thus, the effects of candidate appearance and gender follow the same 
pattern  of  having  noticeably  larger  differences  between  left  and  right  candidates  in  municipal 
elections. 
The fact that there is also a large beauty premium in parliamentary elections and that it is of 
about the same size for candidates on the left and on the right shows that beauty is valued by voters 
across the political spectrum. This general appreciation of beauty could be explained by a belief that 
good-looking candidates are more productive in politics (plausibly since beautiful people are seen as 
more  able  and  are  treated  better  in  social  interactions).  Alternatively,  it  could  be  explained  by 
expressive reasons, namely that voters experience satisfaction by supporting candidates that have a 
striking appearance.
17 
   
                                                       
17 On expressive voting, see Hamlin and Jennings (2011).   24 
VI.   BEAUTY AS A CUE FOR IDEOLOGY 
 
  One  potential  explanation  for  the  larger  beauty  premium  for  candidates  on  the  right  in 
municipal, but not in parliamentary, elections is that voters use beauty as a cue for ideology when 
evaluating candidates in low-information elections. If right voters expect better-looking candidates to 
be closer to them ideologically, then the beauty premium should be higher on the right in elections 
where there is uncertainty about the ideology of candidates.
18 In fact, Rule and Ambady (2010) find 
that people are able to infer whether political candidates are to the left or  to the right only by looking 
at their faces, which may be taken to support the interpretation that voters use facial appearance as a 
cue for non-egalitarianism or similar aspects of ideology. 
It could also be that voters on the right, compared  with voters on the left, consider beauty a 
stronger indication of candidate ability (including the value of beauty in social interaction s). Both of 
these accounts could explain why the partisan difference is present only at the municipal level. At that 
level, voters have less information about candidates’ true degrees of non-egalitarianism and ability, 
which is why they rely on appearance to guide them. In parliamentary elections, an additional piece of 
information becomes available about most challengers, namely their behavior in municipal office. 
With this information available, voters no longer need beauty as a cue for ideology or ability, pushing 
the beauty premia of left and right candidates towards equalization. By contrast, if the explanation 
were  based  on  differences  in  expressive  voting  (e.g.,  right-wing  voters  identifying  more  with  or 
cheering for “the beautiful winners”), there would be no reason for the difference in beauty premia to 
appear in municipal elections only.  
Since  we  asked  respondents  in  our  survey  to  guess  the  party  when  looking  at  photos  of 
politicians, we can test whether good-looking candidates are typically believed to represent parties to 
the right. Table VIII contains the average beauty evaluations grouped by photo-based inference of the 
                                                       
18 An empirical analysis by Price et al. (2011) supports a link between indicators of attractiveness and measures of attitudes 
towards egalitarianism (typically associated with the left). For example, they find that greater self-reported attractiveness is 
negatively related to a preference for egalitarianism.   25 
party of the candidates. Better-looking candidates are more often inferred to represent the right and 
worse-looking candidates to represent the left, thus supporting our interpretation that beauty is used as 
a cue for ideology.  
 
TABLE VIII 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS IN FINNISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN 2004 (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
  Beauty  Number of observations 
Candidates inferred as right  2.82 (1.02)  4833 
p-value of difference  0.000   
Candidates inferred as left  2.69 (0.98)  6092 
Right candidates inferred as right  2.96 (1.04)  1658 
p-value of difference  0.000   
Right candidates inferred as left  2.82 (1.00)  1401 
Left candidates inferred as right  2.67 (0.98)  2218 
p-value of difference  0.001   
Left candidates inferred as left  2.58 (0.96)  3080 
   Notes. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to 
the Left Alliance. One observation is one assessment of one candidate by one respondent. P-values from a t-test of equal 
means are reported between each pair of average evaluations. 
 
Furthermore, we find that the correlation between beauty and competence evaluations does not 
differ between left and right respondents (this classification being based on whether they are in favor 
of or against increasing income redistribution). The correlation coefficient is 0.33 for right respondents 
and 0.30 for left respondents and the difference is far from statistically significant. Since appearance 
seems to be used as a cue for competence to the same extent by right and left voters, the larger beauty 
premium of right candidates in low-information elections is plausibly explained by the use of beauty 
as a cue for ideology. 
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VII.   SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
The  presented  results  indicate  that  political  candidates  from  the  right  look  better  or  more 
competent than political candidates from the left in Australia, Finland, France, and the United States. 
Since candidate appearance is related to electoral success in all of these countries, this indicates that 
parties on the right are favored in elections. For the United States, counterfactual calculations suggest 
that differences in appearance increased the Republican share of Senators by an average of 6% in the 
2000–2006 Senate elections  and gave the Republicans the Senate majority  in the 108
th and 109
th 
Congresses. This points at a link from candidate appearance to policy outcomes: if voters reward 
beauty, the candidates that have the best looks and their parties have an advantage, and their political 
programs are more likely to be implemented. 
We  furthermore  show  that  good  looks  attract  more  votes  for  candidates  on  the  right  in 
municipal, but not in parliamentary, Finnish elections. Our interpretation of the larger beauty premium 
for right candidates at the local level is that voters, in a setting characterized by low information, use 
beauty as a cue for candidate ideology. There are reasons to believe that voters perceive beautiful 
candidates as less egalitarian. In parliamentary elections, voters have access to more information, not 
least since most parliamentary candidates have been politicians at the municipal level, which reduces 
the weight of beauty as a cue and pushes the beauty premia of left and right candidates towards 
equalization.  Although  we  established  this  result  for  a  parliamentary  system  that  operates  under 
proportional representation, it bears noting that intra-party competition in multi-member districts has 
interesting  similarities  with  U.S.  primary  elections.  In  both,  politicians  compete  against  other 
politicians from the same party, at the same time as they try to appeal to less partisan voters. Based on 
our results of a larger beauty premium on the right in low-information elections, we conjecture that 
candidate appearance plays a bigger role in Republican than in Democratic primaries as long as the 
candidates are relatively unknown to voters. 
From a broader perspective, the increased importance of television and the Internet, as well as 
the  increased  political  mobility  of  voters  over  recent  decades,  may  have  advanced  the  electoral   27 
chances of the political right. In fact, Lenz and Lawson (2011) demonstrate that television leads less 
informed  citizens  to  vote  based  on  candidate  appearance.  This  suggests  that  Republicans  have  a 
particular advantage among less-informed voters. 
 
 




AVERAGE EVALUATIONS ACCORDING TO RESPONDENT IDEOLOGY (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
Candidates  Respondents  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right  Right  2.94 (0.72)  3.41 (0.51)  225 
p-value of difference    0.000  0.000   
Left   Right  2.63 (0.71)  3.24 (0.57)  451 
Right  Left  2.85 (0.78)  3.47 (0.54)  204 
p-value of difference    0.006  0.001   
Left  Left  2.66 (0.77)  3.29 (0.65)  365 
Right female   Right  3.04 (0.79)  3.38 (0.49)  122 
p-value of difference    0.0000  0.000   
Left female  Right  2.65 (0.80)  3.16 (0.50)  222 
Right female  Left  3.09 (0.81)  3.48 (0.53)  109 
p-value of difference    0.005  0.001   
Left female  Left  2.82 (0.77)  3.27 (0.56)  175 
Right male   Right  2.83 (0.60)  3.44 (0.53)  103 
p-value of difference    0.003  0.077   
Left male  Right  2.61 (0.62)  3.32 (0.63)  229 
Right male   Left  2.57 (0.55)  3.45 (0.54)  95 
p-value of difference    0.549  0.094     
Left male  Left  2.52 (0.66)  3.31 (0.68)  190 
   Notes.  The  table  contains  candidates  both  from  the  municipal  and  from  the  parliamentary  elections.  Right  candidates 
belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One 
observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. Right respondents “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree” with 
the suggestion “to increase taxes on those with that have high incomes in your country, and distribute the money to those 
with that have low incomes”. Left respondents “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” with the same suggestion. P-values 
from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations for right and left candidates. 
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TABLE A.II 
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED VOTERS IN CHOOSING PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES 
Influence  Share of right voters being 
significantly or somewhat 
influenced 
Share of left voters being 
significantly or somewhat 
influenced 
Candidate’s gender  32%  38% 
Candidate’s age  28%  31% 
Candidate’s educational background  56%  31% 
Candidate’s previous experience in politics  62%  63% 
Candidate’s presence and style  39%  34% 
Candidate’s fame  37%  33% 
Candidate’s views and comments  87%  80% 
Candidate  represents  the  party  supported 
by the voter 
85%  73% 
Candidate’s election 
campaign and advertisements 
25%  21% 
Recommendations 
of a friend, acquaintance, or relative 
10%  9% 
Comments  and  support  of  a  non-
governmental organization 
6%  5% 
   Notes. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to 
the Left Alliance. The numbers presented in the table and in the paper refer to voters for these three parties. 
Source: Karvonen and Paloheimo (2003). 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL TO 
THE RIGHT LOOK: CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS LOOK 
BETTER AND VOTERS REWARD IT 
 
TABLE S.I 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY 
Country  Number of respondents  Percentage 
United States  803  32.0 
Sweden   766  30.5 
France   225  9.0 
Germany  199  7.9 
Denmark   135  5.4 
Other country   385  15.3 
Total  2513  100 
   Notes. 65% of respondents were men and 35% were women. 32% were undergraduate students and 14% were graduate 
students. The average age was 31 (32 for men and 29 for women). 
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TABLE S.II 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS ACCORDING TO RESPONDENT COUNTRY (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
Candidates  Respondent country  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right  Sweden  2.91 (0.75)  3.47 (0.50)  123 
p-value of difference    0.001  0.009   
Left  Sweden  2.63 (0.78)  3.29 (0.65)  244 
Right   United States  2.97 (0.81)  3.37 (0.57)  180 
p-value of difference    0.000  0.005   
Left  United States  2.63 (0.79)  3.21 (0.63)  346 
Right female   Sweden  3.19 (0.78)  3.51 (0.48)  60 
p-value of difference    0.002  0.035   
Left female  Sweden  2.80 (0.81)  3.31 (0.64)  121 
Right female  United States  3.08 (0.83)  3.33 (0.50)  104 
p-value of difference    0.0006  0.012   
Left female  United States  2.68 (0.87)  3.16 (0.56)  168 
Right male   Sweden  2.63 (0.61)  3.43 (0.53)  63 
p-value of difference    0.107  0.108   
Left male  Sweden  2.46 (0.72)  3.28 (0.65)  123 
Right male   United States  2.80 (0.75)  3.41 (0.65)  76 
p-value of difference    0.034  0.082   
Left male  United States  2.59 (0.71)  3.25 (0.68)  178 
   Notes.  The  table contains  candidates  both  from  the  municipal  and  from  the  parliamentary  elections.  Right  candidates 
belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One 
observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair 
of average evaluations for right and left candidates. 
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TABLE S.III 
AVERAGE EVALUATIONS ACCORDING TO CANDIDATE ATTIRE (STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN PARENTHESES) 
Respondents  Candidates  Tie or blouse and/or 
suit 
Beauty  Competence  Number of 
candidates 
All  All  Yes  2.75 (0.67)  3.41 (0.46)  822 
p-value of difference    0.173  0.000   
All  All  No  2.70 (0.64)  3.16 (0.45)  534 
Right  All  Yes  2.78 (0.75)  3.40 (0.54)  404 
p-value of difference    0.068  0.000   
Right  All  No  2.67 (0.69)  3.14 (0.54)  272 
Left  All  Yes  2.71 (0.80)  3.45 (0.60)  355 
p-value of difference    0.538  0.000   
Left  All  No  2.76 (0.75)  3.19 (0.61)  214 
Right  Female  Yes  2.82 (0.83)  3.30 (0.50)  218 
p-value of difference    0.298  0.002   
Right  Female  No  2.73 (0.78)  3.12 (0.50)  126 
Right  Male  Yes  2.72 (0.63)  3.52 (0.57)  186 
p-value of difference    0.157  0.000   
Right  Male  No  2.62 (0.60)  3.15 (0.58)  146 
Left  Female  Yes  2.89 (0.84)  3.39 (0.55)  187 
p-value of difference    0.329  0.128   
Left  Female  No  2.99 (0.70)  3.28 (0.57)  97 
Left  Male  Yes  2.52 (0.70)  3.52 (0.64)  168 
p-value of difference    0.894  0.000   
Left  Male  No  2.56 (0.73)  3.12 (0.63)  117 
   Notes.  The  table contains  candidates  both  from  the  municipal  and  from  the  parliamentary  elections.  Right  candidates 
belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One 
observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair 
of average evaluations for candidates who wear a tie (for men) or blouse and/or suit (for women) and candidates who do not. 